This article presents an alternating offers game that supports a Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (KSS). It is well known that a solution to an alternating offers game has a breakdown point equivalent to a status quo that converges to its Nash bargaining solution because the probability of breakdown becomes negligible, whereas we show that a KSS is obtained if a breakdown gives everything to the player who rejects. The former option, which is adopted by many application papers may be suitable for ex ante production. However, the latter option should be more appropriate for ex post production, because players do not need to be concerned with cooperation.
Introduction
Kalai and Smorodinsky [1] proposed an axiomatic bargaining solution, known as the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (KSS) , that differs from the one pioneered by Nash [2] , which imposed monotonicity instead of independence to irrelevant alternatives. Shaked and Sutton [3] connected a Nash bargaining solution with an alternating offers game originated by Rubinstein [4] , whereas the relationship between a KSS and an alternating offers game has not yet been clarified. Therefore, this study investigates a KSS for this type of game.
In connection with this study, it is interesting to note that monotonicity is substantially incompatible with the irrelevance of independent alternatives [5] . In addition to our consideration of axiomatic approaches and alternating offers games, it may be important to consider other dimensions such as demand games [6, 7] and implementations [8, 9] . Extensions of KSS for asymmetry [10] , endogenous disagreement [11] and non-convex bargaining sets [12] could be examined in each contrasting dimension.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 constructs an alternating offers game, Section 3 finds an equilibrium equivalent to a KSS, and Section 4 concludes this paper.
Model
Two players, 1 and 2, alternately offer their partitions on a strictly convex bargaining set where the frontier is strictly decreasing. Without any loss of generality, such a set is characterized by
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Conclusion
can be broken off with polar allo-The above bargain cations whenever a player rejects an offer, such as when an arbiter abandons a wilful player who offers unreasonably and determines that the availability of resources is not settled during a dispute. This implies that each player can only individually use the resources. This type of bargain is concerning during the sharing of ex post production. By contrast, a Nash bargaining solution is supported when both parties receive nothing following a breakdown. Cooperation is needed to ensure gain, so this type of bargain is likely to arise during ex ante production. Thus, the difference between the two solution concepts may be due to the timing, particularly during competition for resources.
